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Criticism related to the EU’s democratic deﬁcit became more prominent in the aftermath of the
ﬁnancial crisis. According to Firat Cengiz, it is crucial for European citizens to become more
involved in policymaking processes if this deﬁcit is to be overcome. However, she points at an
inherent problem aﬀecting areas such as competition policy, where the increasing prominence of
overly technical language has undermined opportunities for democratic engagement.
The European Union’s democratic deﬁcit reached new dimensions in the aftermath of the 2008
political and ﬁnancial crisis. The member states’ immediate reliance on intergovernmental methods
in crisis management, decreasing solidarity between governments and also partially between the peoples of the
creditor and debtor countries, and the lack of any meaningful role for the European Parliament and national
parliaments in the governance of the Economic and Monetary Union have collectively contributed to citizens’
fundamental distrust of the European economic and political system. Citizens increasingly rely on mechanisms
outside the conventional political system to voice their distrust, as reﬂected in increasing hashtag activism and the
growth of a protesting culture.
The Union’s democratic deﬁcit had been much discussed before the crisis. As an atypical political system that stands
somewhere in between an international organisation and a federal state, the Union does not satisfy the criteria of a
liberal democracy. In a nutshell, this is because in the absence of a directly elected institution with ultimate
legislative power (like national parliaments) and an executive held to account by that legislative (like national
governments), it is incredibly diﬃcult for European citizens to make an impact on decisions made in Brussels
through the ballot box.
Neither does the Union satisfy the republican democracy model that sees democracy as a collective decision-
making process exercised by a demos (a dense harmonious community) to achieve the common good. Some argue
that Europe has multiple demoi rather than a single one. In any case, the Union’s diverse citizenship makes it
diﬃcult for citizens to communicate with each other in a common political sphere.
The fallacy of input-output and democracy-eﬀectiveness divides
Before the crisis, the Union’s democracy problems were partially assumed away in the light of the input-output
legitimacy model. Proponents of this model did not deny that the European Union suﬀered from low citizen ‘input’ to
its policymaking process. But they argued that partially thanks to its technocratic and expertise-driven policymaking
process, the Union created a single market and regulatory policies that are in the interests of citizens. According to
this perspective, this attributed ‘output’ legitimacy to Union governance. The output-based understanding of
democracy was largely inspired by the New Public Management and the European regulatory state theories that
perceive the democratic qualities of policymaking and the eﬀectiveness of policies as entirely separate.
Post-ﬁnancial crisis political developments and citizens’ increasingly vocal stance against the economic and political
system require a fundamental shift in how we perceive and talk about the Union’s democratic deﬁcit. First, given the
increasing welfare gap and inequality between diﬀerent European countries and diﬀerent classes of citizens,
insuﬃcient citizen participation in policymaking cannot be excused with the promise of economic welfare. In other
words, the Union’s ‘input legitimacy deﬁcit’ can no longer be justiﬁed with the promise of ‘output legitimacy’. As
forcefully argued by Beetham, it is never a good idea for a political system to build its relationship with citizens solely
on the promise of performance, because this would leave the relationship vulnerable to a crisis when the promised
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performance cannot be delivered.
Secondly, the input-output dichotomy as well as the New Public Management and the European regulatory state
models can be questioned at a more fundamental level. The ﬁnancial crisis and its management alone stand as
proofs that expertise-driven policymaking at the expense of citizen participation does not guarantee more eﬀective
policies maximising citizen welfare. In the light of post-modern deliberative democracy models the input-output
dichotomy, that perceives the democratic qualities of policymaking and the eﬀectiveness of policies as separate,
appears to suﬀer from a fundamental fallacy.
If citizens provide a direct source of information on policies’ eﬀects on their life experiences and welfare how can
eﬀective policies be made without suﬃcient citizen participation solely on the basis of technical expertise? Put
diﬀerently, how can output legitimacy be achieved without input legitimacy? Deliberative democracy models force us
to question the democracy-eﬀectiveness divide and to embrace a more holistic understanding of policymaking in
which democracy (input) and eﬀectiveness (output) play mutually reinforcing, and not alternative roles.
In the shadow of the post-crisis political developments, and particularly the Greek experiences, the Union’s
economic governance is increasingly criticised for being undemocratic. This burgeoning debate on economic
democracy might have signiﬁcant consequences on the shape of the Union and its relationship with citizens in the
near future, for instance by directly impacting the UK citizens’ decision on whether or not to stay within the Union in
the context of the forthcoming Brexit vote.
Nevertheless, the democracy discourse focuses almost exclusively on high policy issues, such as the management
of the Economic and Monetary Union and the refugee crisis, and it overlooks the democratic qualities of
policymaking in less exciting and more technical areas.
Democracy in Union competition policy
The Union enjoys exclusive power to regulate the customs union, monetary policy for the euro, the common
ﬁsheries policy, common commercial policy and in the area of competition policy. Although these policies do not
attract much public attention due to their technical nature, they have a signiﬁcant impact on citizens’ daily
experiences and their welfare. Since they are exclusively regulated by the Union, democratic input in these areas
essentially depends on mechanisms for citizen participation at the EU-level.
Most decisions regarding these policies are increasingly made within inaccessible and opaque networks, bringing
together national and EU level oﬃcials, bureaucrats, experts and at times interest group members. These networks
do not have any relationship with citizens, and at times they make decisions using soft law methods outside the
Union’s legislative framework. As a result, they exacerbate the EU’s democratic deﬁcit. Since they are relatively
novel governance phenomena, research regarding the democratic qualities of these networks and proposals to
increase democracy in network governance are relatively scarce.
In a recent research project, I have critically assessed the democratic qualities of the EU’s competition policy in this
light. The project studies the participation of citizens and institutions representing their interests, including the
European Parliament and consumer organisations, in the recent reform process of Union competition policy. The
reform process transformed the enforcement of EU rules against anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant
positions and anti-competitive mergers.
Partially inspired by American antitrust policy, the reforms steered EU competition rules toward a neo-liberal
paradigm that employs neo-classical economics as the key enforcement methodology to distinguish between
harmful (ineﬃcient) and harmless (eﬃcient) behaviour. The European Commission orchestrated the reform process
almost singlehandedly and implemented the reforms using soft-law, network governance and coalition-building with
the epistemic community of European and American competition law and economics scholars.
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A discursive analysis of competition policy debates in the European Parliament’s Plenary and its Economic and
Monetary Aﬀairs Committee (between 1999-2014) shows that, in contrast to the European Commission’s insistence
on economic eﬃciency as the key underlying objective of competition policy, Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) envision a multi-faceted policy that pursues several objectives including: social objectives (such as
employment and environmental protection), industrial policy and internal market objectives, SME protection,
protection of consumers, growth, and eﬃciency. After the crisis, MEPs have voiced social policy objectives
consistently and more so than other policy objectives. Additionally, MEPs have complained on several instances
over imperfect transparency in the European Commission’s management of the reform process and for being
eﬀectively blindsided by the Commission.
Figure: Discourses used in competition policy debates in the European Parliament
 
Note: For more information see the author’s longer journal article.
Similar to the European Parliament, consumer organisations have also played a minimal role in the reform process.
This is not only because consumer vis-à-vis business organisations suﬀer from serious collective action and
resource problems, but is also due to the fact that consumer organisations do not speak the same technical
language as Commission oﬃcials. They are also not able to provide the technical information and expertise which is
much needed by Commission oﬃcials in their enforcement activities. Thus, they do not enjoy the same level of
access to policymaking as do business organisations.
Technical policy discourses and democracy
The European Commission and other actors primarily relied on the scientiﬁc expert discourse of neo-classical
economics in the reform process. This technical discourse appears as a key reason for the European Parliament
and consumer organisations’ marginalisation in the reform process. As argued by Foucault, all expert discourses,
particularly those in the context of economics, tend to be exclusionary, because individuals cannot be a part of the
debate and criticise what economics argues without being ﬂuent in its language and methodology.
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This jeopardises democracy in policymaking because apparently technical and scientiﬁc choices often conceal
political choices. As argued by Beetham, most policy decisions reﬂect a choice regarding the social and economic
order and such choices cannot be perceived as purely scientiﬁc or technical – and therefore devoid of political
content. For instance, the competition policy reform process was very much inﬂuenced by the economic policy
choices made in the Union’s Lisbon and Europe 2020 Agendas; and Competition Commissioners Monti, Kroes and
Almunia heavily relied on the Lisbon and Europe 2020 discourses in their defences of the reform process.
Thus, as a ﬁnal note, my research project highlights the fundamental importance of an accessible discourse for
democracy in policymaking. Network governance lacks the procedural and bureaucratic straightjackets of the
EU’s legislative process. Thus, if organised in the light of democratic principles, networks can potentially function as
open, participatory platforms giving citizens a real voice in policymaking. But for this to happen, ﬁrst and foremost,
the currently inaccessible, overly technical discourses used by networks should be replaced with accessible, simple,
citizen friendly ones.
This call for more accessible policy discourses might nevertheless generate criticism from the perspective that
competition and other policies regulating markets and economy are inherently technical. Thus, experts should have
the primary say in these policies, as citizens do not have as much to contribute to the discussion. In response to this,
I argue that competition and similar economic policies make a signiﬁcant impact on citizen welfare – or at least this
is what the European Commission claims – and this makes citizen participation in policymaking a must. Also, the
fact that these policies have become so technical that citizens struggle to be even a part of the conversation in itself
stands as proof of the fundamental democracy problems in the making of these policies.
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